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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XIV FEBRUARY, 1929 No. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF STATE JURISDIC-
TION OVER PROPERTY FOR SUCCESSION
TAX PURPOSES
BY HARRY W. KROEGER
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Inheritance taxes are not taxes on property, but upon the
privilege of transmitting property by will or descent or of suc-
ceeding to property by inheritance.' The distinction is vital,
and by reason of it state succession tax laws have received con-
stitutional sanction which has not been accorded to general
property tax laws. Thus it has been held 2 that a succession tax
in respect of United States bonds is not unconstitutional because
it impairs the borrowing power of the United States.3  So also
it has been held that a succession tax in respect of bonds of the
taxing state, which were exempted from property taxation, was
not violative of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.4
Without violation of the fourteenth amendment, a state may im-
pose different rates of taxation upon successions by persons
standing in different relationships to the decedent, increasing
the rates with the remoteness of the relationship, and employ
graduated scales of tax rates in the case of each class of bene-
ficiary, applying in sliding scale higher rates to larger bequests
and legacies.5
Stebbins v. Riley (1925), 268 U. S. 137, 141.
'Plummer v. Coler (1900), 178 U. S. 115.
"Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheat. 316.
'Orr v. Gilman (1902), 183 U. S. 278.
' Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank (1898), 170 U. S. 283.
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Transmission or succession, and not property, being the sub-
ject matter upon which the state in imposing an inheritance tax
acts, it follows that the constitutional problems arising in con-
nection with the types of transfers sought to be taxed, the man-
ner of imposition of the tax, and the classifications of the sub-
ject matter made by the taxing statute ate to be gauged by
standards having relation to the subject matter of the tax, and
that the constitutional inhibitions, to which direct property
taxes are subject, do not apply. It does not follow, however, by
the same token, that, when the state measures a succession tax
by the amount or value of the property involved in the succes-
sion, the constitutional limitations on its jurisdiction over the
property for direct taxation purposes are inoperative.
It is to the problems of the constitutional limitations of state
jurisdiction over property for succession tax purposes, that I
direct the inquiry of this paper. That the subject matter of
succession taxation is a privilege, I do not presume to question.
That the distinction between property taxation and succession
taxation, based on the privilege nature of the latter, is not a
vital determinant of many constitutional issues, I do not con-
tend. But that a state may constitutionally measure a succes-
sion tax by property over which it has no jurisdiction for the
purposes of direct taxation, I believe, notwithstanding early
authority to the contrary, to be open to question.
The problem naturally divides itself into two topics: First,
what property of a resident decedent may a state take into con-
sideration in measuring the succession tax to be imposed; and
secondly, over what property of a non-resident decedent has a
state jurisdiction so as to enable it to measure a succession tax
which it imposes? In the case of any given decedent, the ques-
tion may be stated in the converse, as follows: What are the
claims of the state of his domicile, and what are the claims of
foreign states asserting jurisdiction to tax with reference to
any portion of the decedent's property?
It has not been denied that, to justify, under the provisions
of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution, a tax
on a succession, the state must have some sort of jurisdiction
' Since practically all of the state inheritance tax laws are in their nature
succession tax laws, I shall, throughout this paper, denominate them by the
latter and more specific term.
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over the property which measures the tax. It will be seen from
the cases herein cited, that such jurisdiction has not always
been postulated upon the same grounds on which jurisdiction to
impose a direct property tax is sustained. The privilege char-
acter of the succession tax has been invoked to justify the power
to tax where jurisdiction to impose direct property taxes has
been denied. Thus it has been said that the state of a decedent
owner's domicile may tax the succession by virtue of the fact
that the law which governs and regulates the succession is a
law of that state's creation. So also the jurisdiction of a for-
eign state to impose a tax, and measure it by certain property,
has been thought sustainable by reason of the fact that recourse
to the courts of that foreign state was or might be necessary in
order to effectuate the transfer of the property in succession, or
to enable the beneficiary to realize thereon. Such was the con-
stitutional dogma at the time of the decision of the case of
Blackstone v. Miller7 in which it is expressed as follows:
"But it is plain that the transfer does depend upon the
law of New York, not because of any theoretical speculation
concerning the whereabouts of the debt, but because of the
practical fact of its power over the person of the debtor.
The principle has been recognized by this court with re-
gard to garnishments of a domestic debtor of an absent
defendant. . . . What gives the debt validity? Noth-
ing but the fact that the law of the place where the debtor
is will make him pay. It does not matter that the law would
not need to be invoked in the particular case."
More recently the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company v.Doughton8 speak-
ing through Chief Justice Taft, expressed a view of jurisdiction
to measure a succession tax by given property, which varies
materially from the expressions of the Blackstone case and
which, I submit, renders invalid, in the constitutional dogma of
today, a succession tax in respect of property which the state
had no constitutional jurisdiction to tax directly.
"The tax here is not upon property, but upon the right of
succession to property, but the principle that the subject
to be taxed must be within the jurisdiction of the state ap-
(1903), 188 U. S. 189, 205.
(1926), 270 U. S. 69, 80.
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plies as well in the case of a transfer tax as in that of a
property tax. A state has no power to tax the devolution
of the property of a non-resident unless it has jurisdiction
of the property devolved or transferred."
It is my general conception that the law of due process as ap-
plied to state jurisdiction over property for succession tax pur-
poses, is the joint making of the older dogma, so far as questions
were settled at the time that dogma prevailed, and of the newer
dogma so far as questions have come more recently to the Su-
preme Court of the United States for decision and so far as they
may come in the near future. If my conception be a true one,
then cases involving property taxes and cases involving succes-
sion taxes may be interchangeably cited to sustain or oppose the
validity of either of such taxes. In such event also, it would
follow that the nature of succession taxes, as taxes imposed up-
on the privilege of succession, would have no bearing upon the
law of due process in its application to the property with respect
to which a succession tax is imposable, whatever vitality a dis-
tinction, based upon such privilege, between succession taxes
and property taxes might have in questions of classification for
the purposes of taxation under the due process clause, or in
constitutional questions arising under clauses of the Federal
Constitution other than the fourteenth amendment.
I shall consider, first, the claims of the domiciliary state to
taxing jurisdiction, and then certain claims of the foreign states
to such jurisdiction in respect of types of property concerning
which the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken.
H. JURISDICTION OF DOMICILIARY STATE
Before the case of Frick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvniag
was decided, it had been generally thought that the state of the
domicile of a decedent had the power to tax the succession to all
of the decedent's personal property, tangible and intangible.10
Such property devolves according to the law of the state of the
owner's domicile." By the law of that state, the proper con-
struction of the decedent's will is to be determined, and accord-
ing to that law the persons entitled to distribution, if the dece-
'(1925), 268 U. S. 473.
See note, 16 HARv. L. REv. 522, 523.
Ennis v. Smith (1852), 14 How. 400, 424.
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dent left no will, is to be ascertained. Because the state created
the right to succeed to the property, it was supposed that it had
justifiable ground to impose a tax on the succession thereto. If
succession taxes are privilege taxes, it would seem to follow that
no state should have a better claim to tax the succession than
the state which by its law created the right to succession, or, in
the case of personalty, the law of the decedent's domicile. Not
only had the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the tax
with respect to intangible personalty, but it had uttered dicta
which justified the assumption that no distinction between the
case of intangible personalty and chattels would be made. Thus
in Blackstone v. Miller,12 Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"To come closer to the point, no one doubts that succes-
sion to a tangible chattel may be taxed wherever the prop-
erty is found, and none the less that the law of the situs
accepts its rules of succession from the law of the domi-
cile, or that by the law, of the domicile the chattel is part
of a universitas and is taken into account again in the suc-
cession tax there."
A similar dictum may be found in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Bullen v. Wisconsin,13 decided as late as 1916.
Frick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania4 has fixed the law
relating to tangible personalty to the contrary. This case in-
volved a Pennsylvania statute providing that, where a person
domiciled in that state should die seized or possessed of property,
real or personal, a tax should be levied on the transfer of the
property, by will or intestate laws, whether the property be in
that state or elsewhere. Mr. Frick died domiciled in Pennsyl-
vania, leaving an estate which included real estate in various
states, a collection of rare paintings, furniture and art treasures,
housed in a building in New York especially constructed for
that purpose, considerable other tangible personal property
located in Mr. Frick's New York and Massachusetts residences,
and various stocks in corporations of states other than Pennsyl-
vania, the certificates for which were kept outside of Pennsyl-
vania. The court held that the taxing statute was unconstitu-
tional insofar as it imposed a tax upon the succession to realty
"(1903), 188 U. S. 189, 204.
240 U. S. 625, 631.
" Supra, note 9.
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and tangible personalty physically situated outside the state of
Pennsylvania, but that the tax upon the succession to the stock
of foreign corporations standing in the name of decedent was
valid. Neither did the denial by the court of the power to tax
with respect to extra-state realty, nor the affirmation of the
power to tax with respect to the stock, run counter to the law
as it had been conceived to be. The denial of the power to im-
pose a tax with respect to chattels physically without the state
was a radical departure. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, delivering
the opinion of the court, said :15
"The Pennsylvania statute is a tax law, not an escheat
law. This is made plain by its terms and by the opinion
of the state court. The tax which it imposes is not a prop-
erty tax but one laid on the transfer of property on the
death of the owner. This distinction is stressed by coun-
sel for the state. But to impose either tax the state must
have jurisdiction over the thing that is taxed, and to im-
pose either without such jurisdiction is mere extortion and
in contravention of due process of law. Here the tax was
imposed on the transfer of tangible personalty having an
actual situs in other states-New York and Massachusetts.
This property, by reason of its character and situs, was
wholly under the jurisdiction of those states and in no way
under the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania. True, its owner
was domiciled in Pennsylvania, but this neither brought it
under the jurisdiction of that state nor subtracted anything
from the jurisdiction of New York and Massachusetts. In
these respects the situation was the same as if the property
had been immovable realty. The jurisdiction possessed by
the states of the situs was not partial but plenary, and in-
cluded power to regulate the transfer both inter vivos and
on the death of the owner, and power to tax both the prop-
erty and the transfer."
The contention made by the Commonwealth that the tax was
not a tax upon extra-state property, but upon the privilege of
succession, and it was therefore permissible to use as a basis of
taxation the total value of the estate, was rejected by the court.
It may be said that a measure of taxation based on extra-terri-
torial values is an unconstitutional measure, and the tax based
thereon an unconstitutional tax.
By the Frick case, the rule as to succession taxes is brought
Supra, note 9, 1. c. 492.
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into conformity with the rule as to direct property taxation of
chattels, as expressed in Union Refrigerator Transit Company
v. Kentucky.16 Although the former are still conceded to be
privilege taxes, the power of the state to tax is confined to the
same constitutional limitations, as to extra-territoriality, as are
direct ad valorem taxes.
The Frick case is by no means a denial of the right of the
state to impose a tax with respect to intangible personalty. It
recognizes without question the right of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to impose a tax with respect to shares of stock
owned by Mr. Frick in corporations organized under the laws
of other states, but it appeai s that the court limits Pennsylvania
to taxing the residue of their value after the deduction of suc-
cession taxes paid to the states where the corporations were
respectively chartered. 17 The latter holding is based on the
theory that such stocks are not brought into Pennsylvania ad-
ministration until after payment of the foreign succession tax-
a conception which, also, is difficult to reconcile with the
privilege theory of succession taxation, since the privilege of
succession vests immediately upon the death of the owner.
As in the Frick case the Supreme Court spoke its denial of
the constitutional power of the domiciliary state to tax with
respect to tangibility physically located in another state, so in
a recent case, Blodgett v. Silberman,18 it spoke its affirmation
of that power with respect to personal intangibility. The lat-
ter case concerned the right of the State of Connecticut to im-
pose a tax on the succession to certain property of Robert B.
Hirsch, who died a resident of that state. Among the items as
to which the right of the state to tax was disputed were: the
decedent's interest in a New York limited partnership doing
business in New York, the proceeds of a policy of life insurance
issued by a New York insurance company and payable to the
estate, shares of stock in New York, New Jersey and Canadian
corporations, the certificates representing which were kept in
New York, and bonds of the United States also kept in New
York. As to all of these items, over which the state's sole claim
of jurisdiction rested upon the place of the decedent's domicile,
*' (1905), 199 U. S. 194.
Supra, note 9, 1. c. 497.(1928), 48 S. Ct. 410, 72 L. Ed. (Adv.) 470.
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the court sustained the tax. "For present purposes," said
Chief Justice Taft for the court, "it suffices that intangible per-
sonalty has such a situs at the domicile of its owner that its
transfer on his death may be taxed there."
Of particular interest in the case is the treatment of the
United States bonds. The Connecticut Court of Appeals, dis-
tinguishing public securities from the obligations of private
debtors, had declared the former to be a "species of tangible
personal property," and hence, under the new orthodoxy of the
Frick case, taxable only at the place where they might be
physically located. Support for this view was sought, and
found, to the Connecticut court's satisfaction, in the much
quoted dictum of Mr. Justice Field in State Tax on Foreign Held
Bonds :'1
"It is undoubtedly true that the actual situs of personal
property which has a visible and tangible existence, and
not the domicile of its owner, will, in many cases, determine
the state in which it may be taxed. The same thing is true
of public securities consisting of state bonds and bonds of
municipal bodies, and circulating notes of banking institu-
tions; the former, by general usage, have acquired the
character of, and are treated as, property in the place where
they are found, though removed from the domicile of the
owner; the latter are treated and pass as money wherever
they are."
Mr. Justice Field was in the Foreign Held Bonds case dealing
with the validity of a Pennsylvania tax on the income to non-
residents from interest on the bonds of domestic corporations.
The quoted passage was therefore mere dictum, but even if
taken at face value, it clearly did not go so far as to define pub-
lic securities as tangible property. From the proposition, con-
tained in the dictum, that public securities are taxable by the
state wherein the paper is physically located, the Connecticut
court jumped to the proposition that the power of that state to
tax was exclusive and denied the jurisdiction of the state of the
owner's domicile. Such a denial was a distinct departure,
justifiable, under prevailing law, only if public securities con-
stitute tangible property. Were it true that the debt inhered in
the paper which expressed the obligation, and had no inde-
(1872), 15 Wall. 300, 323.
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pendent existence, it might well be considered tangible property.
But such is not the case in the instance of the public securities,
any more than it is in the case of the private securities which
the Connecticut court admitted were taxable in the domiciliary
state. In reversing the decision of the Connecticut court re-
specting its holding on public securities, Mr. Justice Taft, de-
livering the opinion of the Supreme Court, said :20
"The question here is whether bonds, unlike other choses
in action, may have a situs different from the owner's
domicile such as will render their transfer taxable in the
state of that situs and in only that state. We think bonds
are not thus distinguishable from other choses in action.
It is not enough to show that the written or printed evi-
dence of ownership may, by the law of the state in which
they are physically present, be permitted to be taken in exe-
cution or dealt with as reaching that of which they are
evidence, even without the presence of the owner. While
bonds often are so treated, they are nevertheless in their
essence only evidences of debt. The Supreme Court of Er-
rors expressly admits that they are choses in action.
Whatever incidental qualities may be added by usage of
business or by statutory provision, this characteristic re-
mains, and shows itself by the fact that their destruction
physically will not destroy the debt which they represent.
They are representative, and not the thing itself."
In its principal holding that the succession to intangible per-
sonalty is taxable in the state of the decedent owner's domicile,
the Silberman case makes no new law. The doctrine had been
repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States
in property tax cases, 21 where the naked question of jurisdiction
over the property is presented, and in a leading income tax
case. 22 The restatement is, however, interesting from various
angles. In the first place, because it not only brings the law of
jurisdiction in succession tax cases into conformity with the
law in property tax cases, but cites as a leading authority for
its holding Kirtland v. Hotchkiss,2 3 which upheld the jurisdiction
"Supra, note 18, 1. c. 415.
" Darnell v. Indiana (1912), 226 U. S. 390; Hawley v. City of Malden
(1914), 232 U. S. 1; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Company v. City of Louis-
ville (1917), 245 U. S. 54; Citizens National Bank of Cincinnati v. Durr
(1921), 257 U. S. 99.
. Maguire v. Trefry (1920), 253 U. S. 12.
- (1879), 100 U. S. 491.
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of the state of the owner's domicile to tax bonds evidencing debts
owing from nonresidents, "wherever actually held or deposited,"
and regardless of the existence in another state of property
mortgaged as security therefor. Secondly, being superimposed
upon the Frick case, it crystallizes the law governing the power
of the domiciliary state into a simple rule, viz., the state may tax
the succession to all intangible personalty of a decedent, and
such of his tangible property as has physical presence in the
state; but it may not tax the succession to tangible property
located without the state. Queries as to whether Frick v.
Pennsylvania would be followed by further decisions limiting
the power of the domiciliary state may be resolved. Finally
and most interestingly, the opinion declined to rationalize the
result attained. The maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, "in-
sofar as it relates to intangible property," the Court considered
so fully sustained by the cases, that it must be treated as set-
tled, "whether it approve itself to legal philosophic test or not."
The court does not speak of the "privilege" of the state furnish-
ing the law of succession to tax it. The ratio decidendi is sim-
ply stare decisis.
Upon what distinction between tangible and intangible per-
sonalty is the denial of the power of the domiciliary state to tax
in the case of the former type of property (unless physically
within the state), and the upholding of that power in the case
of the latter, to be postulated? What is the true theory of the
domiciliary state's power to impose a tax with respect to all the
intangible personalty of a decedent? In most instances, there
are bases of taxation independent of the mere residence of the
decedent in the state. Thus the bonds of the decedent's estate
may be physically present in the state, or the corporations in
which the decedent owns stock may be chartered under the laws
of the domiciliary state. But suppose all independent bases of
taxation be eliminated, and the state's claim to tax is based
solely upon the decedent's residence in the state. Such is the
problem presented by the Silberman case.
It can no longer be asserted without qualification, that the
power of the state of the domicile to tax is based upon the
privilege of succession to the property which its law creates.
That law is applied to the devolution of chattels, but succession
to chattels is not therefore taxable. That the Supreme Court
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss2/1
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has abandoned the "law-of-devolution" theory of taxation as a
basis of decision, may be observed from the following passage
from the Frick opinion :24
"Obviously the accepted domiciliary law could not in itself
have any force or application outside that state. Only in
virtue of its express or tacit adoption by the states of the
situs could it have any force or application in them."
It appears from this that not only was the tax on the succes-
sion to chattels bad because the domiciliary state was attempting,
in the exercise of its supposed privilege, to reach extra-terri-
torial values, but also because it didn't have any privilege to
begin with.
While taxation of the succession to intangible personalty by
the domiciliary state, is not within the ban of the Frick case,
because intangibles have no territoriality, but on the contrary
the power to so tax has been affirmed by the Silberman case,
yet the Frick case has, I submit, broken down the reasoning on
which such taxation had theretofore been considered sustain-
able, viz., because it furnishes the law of succession, the state of
the domicile may levy an excise tax.25 If that state does not
have the power to tax when, as in the Frick case, it does not
apply its law of devolution, the mere origin of the law of devolu-
tion does not vest the power.
It has likewise been asserted that the jurisdiction obtained
through domiciliary administration, in the courts of probate,
gives the domiciliary state the power to tax. With the advent
of the Frick decision, however, this theory likewise falls, for
chattels located in foreign states come into domiciliary adminis-
tration but under that decision are not therefore taxable.
I recognize that it may still be contended that the law-of-
devolution theory or the probate-jurisdiction theory (which is
really a corollary of the former) still hold good except insofar
as they may be crossed and limited by the doctrine of extra-
territoriality announced in the Frick case. The domiciliary
state, it may be said, has plenary jurisdiction over the succes-
sion to all personal property of its subjects, because it furnishes
the law which affirms and regulates that succession. Where it
Supra, note 9, 1. c. 494.
See Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919), 32 HARV. L. REV. 587, 624.
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attempts to tax tangibles located outside the state, such tax is
subject to the objection of extra-territoriality, but where it taxes
intangibles, no vice exists because intangibles have no terri-
toriality nor extra-territoriality. Hence there is no hindrance
to the state's exercise of its plenary jurisdiction.
Such reasoning would, in my mind, be a forced adaptation of
an old theory to the new state of law. It was fashioned in the
model of a supposed constitutional distinction between real and
personal property. The law, as it now stands, distinguishes
only between tangible and intangible property.
It being the rule that the state may not impose a tax with re-
spect to tangible property, (unless physically located in the
state), but may impose a tax with respect to intangible per-
sonalty, it seems proper to deny or affirm its jurisdiction on the
basis of the natures, respectively, of those classes of property.
The rights of the owner of tangible property lie in possession.
The rights of the owner of intangible personalty lie in action.
Through its jurisdiction over the person, it is submitted, the
domiciliary state also has jurisdiction over the choses in action
which have no existence independent of the owner who can en-
force them, and which constitute his legalistic personalty. A
share of stock would seem therefore to be within the taxing
jurisdiction of the domiciliary state, not because it is personalty,
but because it is a chose in action. The succession thereto would
seem to be taxable, not by reason of that state's legal tolerance
of that succession, but because the chose-in-action inhered in the
decedent owner, whose passing resulted in the succession.
HI. JURISDICTION OF FOREIGN STATES--DEBTS
The jurisdiction of the domiciliary state to tax the succession
to intangibles is not a territorial jurisdiction, and its power is,
therefore, in no sense a denial of the power of another state to
tax, if the latter has constitutional jurisdiction. In and of it-
self double taxation of succession is free from constitutional
vice. 2
6
What are the grounds of jurisdiction which a state, other
than that of the decedent owner's domicile, may have to justify
a tax on the succession to portions of his intangible personal
"Blackstone v. Miller (1903), 188 U. S. 189, 205, 207; Maxwell v. Bugbec(1919), 250 U. S. 525, 538.
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property? Or, since, as will be seen, the grounds of jurisdiction
depend upon the nature of the property, the question may be
more properly stated in the converse-What attributes of the
various types of intangible personalty lend themselves to the
constitutional power of the foreign state to tax? I shall con-
sider, in this paper, only two classes of intangibles, debts and
corporate shares.
A debt is the obligation of one juristic person, a debtor, to pay
another juristic person, a creditor, a sum of money. The obli-
gation may arise by virtue of an act done in a definite place,
but the cause of action based thereon is transitory. The debt
may or may not be evidenced by a negotiable instrument, to
which special attributes, having their origin in the law mer-
chant, attach; and it may or may not be secured by collateral.
Such are the fundamental characteristics of this type of chose
in action.
(a) State of the Domicile of the Debtor.
The owner of the debt dies. The state where he was domi-
ciled at the time of his death, exacts a succession tax. Can the
state, where the debtor is domiciled, likewise exact a tax? Under
the decision in Blackstone v. Miller,2 7 which still stands, such a
tax is without constitutional vice.
While decided in 1903, the criticism to which the Blackstone
case has been subjected, and the virtual refusal of some state
courts to follow it, project a certain amount of doubt into the
future as to whether or not it will stand unmodified.
The case of State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds28 was in the
fabric of the law, when the Blackstone case was decided. While
the holding of the earlier case was merely that a state tax of five
per cent, payable at source, on amounts disbursed as interest on
bonds of domestic corporations was unconstitutional when ap-
plied to amounts paid to nonresidents of the state, the opinion
therein expressed a view on the power of the state of the debtor's
domicile to tax property, which is at variance with the result
of the Blackstone case. The court's dictum (opinion of Mr.
Justice Field) was as follows :29
- (1903), 188 U. S. 189.
" (1872), 15 Wall. 300.
Supra, note 28, 1. c. 319.
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"Corporations may be taxed, like natural persons, upon
their property and business. But debts owing by corpora-
tions, like debts owing by individuals, are not property of
the debtors in any sense; they are obligations of the debtors
and only possess value in the hands of the creditors. With
them they are property, and in their hands they may be
taxed. To call debts property of the debtors, is simply to
misuse terms. All the property there can be, in the nature
of things in debts of corporations, belongs to the creditors,
to whom they are payable, and follows their domicile, wher-
ever that may be."
In Blackstone v. Miller, a New York tax on the succession to
promissory notes made by a resident of New York and a deposit
kept in a New York bank were sustained as to an Illinois de-
cedent's estate. The much quoted passage from the opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes, upholding the tax, was as follows :30
"If the transfer of the deposit necessarily depends upon
and involves the law of New York for its exercise, or in other
words, if the transfer is subject to the power of the state
of New York, then New York may subject the transfer to a
tax. United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 628, 629, 41
L. ed. 287, 288, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1073; M'Cullough v. Mary-
land, 4 Wheat. 316, 429, 4 L. ed. 579, 607. But it is plain
that the transfer does depend upon the law of New York,
not because of any theoretical speculation concerning the
whereabouts of the debt, but because of the practical fact
of its power over the person of the debtor. The principle
has been recognized by this court with regard to garnish-
ments of a domestic debtor of an absent defendant. Chi-
cago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 43 L. ed.
1144, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797. See Wyman v. Halstead, 109
U. S. 654, sub nom. Wyman v. United States ex rel. Hal-
stead, 27 L. ed. 1068, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 417. What gives the
debt validity? Nothing but the fact that the law of the
place where the debtor is will make him pay. It does not
matter that the law would not need to be invoked in the
particular ease."
State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds is thus in effect an apotheo-
sis of the view that jurisdiction to tax intangibles must be found
in the presence in the state of some attribute of the chose giving
it value. Blackstone v. Miller is in effect an apotheosis of the
Supra, note 27, 1. c. 205.
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view that the jurisdiction may be based upon the potential pro-
tection given to the right by the laws of the taxing state. Are
the views reconcilable by reason of the one having reference to
property taxation, and the other to succession taxation? Is the
configuration of the Blackstone case woven into the fabric beside
that of the State Tax case, or does the weaving of the former
obliterate all but the historical background created by the latter?
Fundamentally the view of the Blackstone case is that the tax is
justifiable on the basis of the potential protection afforded by the
laws of the state of the debtor's domicile. Since that protection
is not a peculiar incident to the succession, but one which sub-
sists during the entire period of ownership, and should, there-
fore, if it justifies a succession tax, also justify a property tax,
it seems that in logic Blackstone v. Miller must supersede State
Tax on Foreign Held Bonds. It may perhaps be urged that, for
the purpose of founding administration, contract debts are as-
sets at the domicile of the debtor,3 ' and, since the personal repre-
sentative must procure ancillary administration in the latter
state to collect his debt, the succession is under the jurisdiction
of that state. But the debtor may voluntarily pay the personal
representative, 32 from which it appears that the protection af-
forded the succession is like the protection afforded the living
creditor, merely potential.
Thus far I have merely submitted that the logic of the Black-
stone case is applicable to property taxation also. Whether it
or the logic of the State Tax case is more in line with the trend
of more recent Supreme Court decisions is another question.
The doctrine of the Blckstone case has been ably defended
by Professor Carpenter,3 3 who urged, in a vein almost prophetic
of the Frick case, so far as that case goes, that the fiction mobilia
sequuntur personam furnishes no basis for a tax by the state of
the decedent owner's domicile, and that exclusive jurisdiction to
tax debts should reside in the state of the debtor's domicile, since
that state gives the protection which makes the debt valuable to
the creditor. The reasoning of the State Tax case was criti-
cised as a misconception, 34 it being asserted that the tax law was
See Wyman v. Halstead (1883), 109 U. S. 654, 656.
See Wilkins v. Ellett (1869), 9 Wall. 740.
Jurisdiction over Debts (1918), 31 HARV. L. REv. 905 et seq.
"Supra, note 33, 1. c. 929.
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not an attempt to tax debts as assets of the debtor. If it be ad-
mitted, however, that no assets reside with the debtor, it is diffi-
cult to see how the debtor's presence brings into the taxing state
any jurisdiction over any attribute of the chose so as to make
it amenable to taxation. As has been pointed out by Professor
Beale,35 the tax, if upon the property of the debtor amenable to
the payment of the debt, is a second tax upon the same interest
in the same thing, and, if upon the intangible right, is a tax on a
vacuum, for at the residence of the debtor the chose in action is
a liability.
From the standpoint of practical operation, the Blackstone
doctrine has been subjected to severe criticism.30 It has been
pointed out that, if the tax is based upon the potential necessity
of the personal representative availing himself of the courts of
the debtor's state to collect the debt, it would logically then fol-
low that every state where the debtor had property would have
a claim to tax, for the power of the courts of those states might
have to be invoked in attachment or garnishment suits, and
those states, too, afford potential protection. Where the debtor
owns debts, and the debtor of the debtor owns debts, the com-
plete power to tax can only be found by the unravelling of
Chinese boxes.
The Blackstone case has had a short history in the Supreme
Court of the United States. Its doctrine has been stated, with-
out consideration, and as dictum, in Maxwell v. Bugbeel' and
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Company.38  In the state courts, how-
ever, the reaction to it is very interesting.
It will be recalled that the case came up by way of writ of
error to the Court of Appeals of New York, where the decision
in favor of the tax39 had been based solely on the ground that a
bank deposit was assimilable to cash. Both before" the Black-
stone case, and after 4 1 it has been the law in New York that
Jurisdiction to Tax (1919), 32 HARV. L. REV. 587, 603.
See Beale, supra, note 35, 1. c. 604.
(1919), 250 U. S. 525, 543.
(1917), 242 U. S. 394, 401.
'In re Blackstone's Estate (1902), 171 N. Y. 682, 64 N. E. 1118.
'Matter of Bronson (1896), 150 N. Y. 1, 5, 44 N. E. 707.
'Matter of Fearing (1911), 200 N. Y. 340, 344, 93 N. E. 356; Matter of
Lowell (1924), 208 App. Div. 201, 204, 206, 203 N. Y. S. 312, affirmed
(1924), 239 N. Y. 532, 14 N. E. 183.
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bonds of New York corporations, actually held outside the state
by nonresident decedents, were not subject to the succession tax
in New York as "property within the state."
The Appellate Division in Matter of Lowell42 considered the
Blackstone case, but felt itself bound to ignore the authority of
the Blackstone case in view of the later decisions of the New
York Court of Appeals in Matter of Gordon,43 and in Matter of
Fearing."4 The latter court in the Gordon case, holding that
the proceeds of a life insurance policy issued by a domestic in-
surance company to a nonresident decedent were not subject to
New York succession tax, said of the Blackstone case :45
"The Supreme Court of the United States in the opinion
delivered by Judge Holmes, however, deemed it wise to go
beyond this ground [that bank deposits were assimilable
to cash] and holds that a tax could be sustained even upon
the theory that the deposit was an ordinary debt. But this
holding was unequivocally based upon the conditions dis-
closed in that case, which were that the debtor resided with-
in the state and that the creditor must come there and take
advantage of the laws of the state for the purpose of en-
forcing his claim."
Obviously this is no distinction.
In view of the fact that the Court of Appeals should have felt
itself bound to distinguish the case before it from the Blackstone
case, inquiry may properly be raised as to whether a real con-
flict of decision subsists in the treatment of the taxability of
the succession to obligations owed by a resident of the state to
a nonresident decedent. Strictly speaking, the New York courts
were, in the cases cited, considering merely the question, are
such obligations "property within the state" within the mean-
ing of the state taxing statute? The United States court in the
Blackstone case responded to the question, assuming that the
state has attempted to exercise the power to impose a tax, do
constitutional limitations supervene? To the extent that these
questions are substantially, and not merely superficially, dif-
ferent, no conflict of decision subsists. However, the real test
" Supra, note 41.
"(1906), 186 N. Y. 471, 79 N. E. 722.
"Supra, note 41.
"See p. 475, case, supra, note 43.
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of constitutional limitation, applied from State Tax on Foreign
Held Bonds to Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company v. Dough-
ton,46 has been one of jurisdiction over the property subjected to
tax. Thus it was said in the latter case (a succession tax case
to which I shall have future occasion to advert), "it goes with-
out saying that a state may not tax property which is not within
its territorial jurisdiction." Unless it may be asserted that the
corporate bonds which were the subject of the tax in the Lowell
case, were not "within the state" as that phrase was employed
in the state taxing statute, but were "within the state" for the
purposes of due process, the New York court ran the gauntlet
of the Blackstone case, and a differentiation such as was made
of the latter case on the basis of the facts involved was in order.
Is there such a difference between the statutory connotation
of property "within the state" and the constitutional connota-
tion of that term, which ought to lead to a different result when
applied to property in the same situation so far as the state
jurisdiction is concerned? Such difference, if it exists, must be
postulated on the doctrine that taxing statutes must be strictly
construed against the sovereign.47  But ought not an equally
strict construction of what constitutes property "within the
state" be employed when constitutional limitations are concern-
ed? While the incidence of double or triple taxation by various
states of a succession may be without constitutional objection, it
furnishes substantial reason why the highest court of the land
should equally strictly construe the doctrine of jurisdiction over
the property, when a state attempts to impose a tax on the
basis of so tenuous a ground of jurisdiction over a debt as juris-
diction over the debtor. It is therefore submitted that if a de-
cision of that court, affirming state jurisdiction over certain
property, is followed by state decisions denying the state juris-
diction on the ground that the property is not "within the state,"
such state decisions must at least be taken as suggesting recon-
sideration by the Supreme Court of the United States of its
doctrine, even though the connotation of property "within the
state" may be different in the two cases.
'- (1926), 270 U. S. 69, 80.
"See U. S. v. Merriam (1923), 263 U. S. 179, 188; Schwab v. Doyle
(1922), 258 U. S. 529, 534.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Bliss v.
Bliss," held the succession to debts owed by a partnership to a
nonresident decedent not taxable in Massachusetts where the
partnership business was carried on, distinguishing the case be-
fore the court from the Blackstone case on the theory that the
partnership had property in the state of the owner's domicile,
and it was therefore unnecessary for the personal representa-
tive to have recourse to the Massachusetts courts to collect the
debt. If it be remembered that potential, and not actual, re-
course to the courts of the debtor's state was according to
Blackstone v. Miller the basis of that state's power to tax, the
Massachusetts court would seem to be in the position of finding
differences, rather than distinctions, to justify a contrary
holding.
A number of state decisions have willingly followed Black-
stone v. Miller.4" Others have shown a distinct disinclination to
adopt its doctrine.50  The latter cases have the merit of con-
formity with the current of state decision contrary to the con-
stitutional power of the state of debtor's domicile to impose a
property tax on debts.51 Not only the doctrinal and practical
objections interposed by Professor Beale to the decision in the
Blackstone case, but also the disinclination of strong state courts
to follow it, leave it to be hoped that the case will be overruled,
and a coherence between the law of succession taxation and the
law of property taxation, relating to the power to tax a debt by
virtue of jurisdiction over the debtor, will be achieved.
(b) State Where Negotiable Paper May Be Lodged.
Two special classes of debts require consideration, viz., ne-
gotiable instruments and debts secured by mortgage or pledge.
The leading case on negotiable instruments is Wheeler v.
Sohmer,5 which involved the power of the State of New York to
1 (1915), 221 Mass. 201, 109 N. E. 148.
' State ex rel. Graff v. Probate Court of St. Louis County (1915), 128
Minn. 371, 150 N. W. 1094; State ex rel. Marsh v. Probate Court of St.
Louis County (1926), 168 Minn. 508, 210 N. W. 389; State ex rel. Knox
County Collector v. Bunce (1915), 187 Mo. A. 607, 173 S. W. 101; see also
cases cited by Carpenter, 31 HARv. L. REv. 926, note 67.
1 Cases cited, supra, notes 41 and 43; Walker v. People (1918), 64 Colo.
148, 171 Pac. 747; Gilbertson v. Oliver (1906), 129 Iowa, 568, 105 N. W.
1002; People v. Blair (1917), 276 Ill. 623, 115 N. E. 218; McLaughlin v.
Cluff (1925), 66 Utah 245, 240 P. 161; see also, note 42 A. L. R. 354, 357.
See cases cited by Beale, 32 HARv. L. REV. 605, note 90.(1914), 233 U. S. 434.
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tax the succession to four promissory notes made by a resident
of Illinois and secured by mortgages on Chicago real estate and
several notes of the Southern Railway Company, a Virginia cor-
poration. The decedent owner was a resident of Connecticut
and the sole ground of jurisdiction of the State of New York
was the presence of the notes in a safe deposit box in New York.
In sustaining the tax, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Holmes, said :3
"But it is plain that bills and notes, whatever they may
be called, come very near to identification with the contract
that they embody. An endorsement of the paper carries
the contract to the endorsee. An indorsement in blank
passes the debt from hand to hand so that whoever has the
paper has the debt."
The effect of the Wheeler case on the law of due process as
applied to succession taxes can only be judged in the light of the
property tax cases which had anteceded. Buck v. Beach" had
been decided only seven years before the Wheeler case. There
the court held invalid an Indiana property tax on notes made by
residents of Ohio and owned by a resident of New York, but kept
in a safe in Indiana. No business was transacted in regard to
the notes in Indiana. A few days before maturity, they were
customarily sent to an Ohio agent of the owner for collection.
As the custody of the securities in Indiana was interrupted only
by the annual shipment thereof into Ohio a day or two before
tax assessment day in Indiana, after which they were imme-
diately returned to the latter state (a point which the court
did not consider controlling), the decision appears to be a denial
that permanent physical presence of negotiable instruments was
sufficient to justify the tax.
Buck v. Beach was superimposed upon two lines of authority
which sustained property taxes on negotiable instruments where
jurisdiction was based solely upon presence in the state of the
paper. Thus there was a line of authority to the effect that
where the owner of negotiable instruments maintained and ad-
ministered them through an agent in a state other than that
of the owner's residence, they acquired what was designated as
See p. 439, case, supra, note 52.(1907), 206 U. S. 392.
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"business situs" in the state of their administration. 55 A second
line of authority is based upon the decision in State Tax on For-
eign Held Bonds, supra, and upholds the jurisdiction of the state
to tax instruments under seal present in the state.
The divergence of opinions among the justices in the Wheeler
case presents a very interesting study in parallelism between due
process as applied to property taxes and due process as applied
to succession taxes. The majority opinion, rendered by Mr.
Justice Holmes, after announcing the theory, as above quoted,
that near-identification of negotiable instruments with the con-
tracts which they embody justified a succession tax by the
state where the paper was found, distinguished the case at bar
from the Buck case on the ground that in the latter case the
paper was only temporarily present in the taxing state. If the
statement of facts in the Buck case is correct, the continued
presence of the paper in the state was interrupted only by its
temporary excursion from the state-over tax day. Mr. Justice
McKenna, in a separate opinion in the Wheeler case, took issue
with the Holmes opinion in its interpretation of the Buck case,
but concurred in the result reached in the case at bar on the
theory that a succession tax is not a tax on property but upon
the transfer of the property, and since the laws of the state
where the paper was found were invoked to accomplish the
transfer, it had jurisdiction to tax. Due process as applied to
succession taxes admitted, in Mr. Justice McKenna's opinion, of
broader jurisdiction to tax than due process as applied to prop-
erty taxes. Mr. Justice Pitney agreed with Mr. Justice Mc-
Kenna. Mr. Justice Lamar, in a dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice White and Mr. Justice Van Devanter concurred,
felt that Buck v. Beach stood broadly for the principle that the
presence of a negotiable instrument in the state furnished no
jurisdiction to tax, and that that decision was controlling in the
matter of succession taxes as well as property taxes.
This then was the situation: Six Justices upheld the power of
the state where a negotiable instrument was lodged, to tax the
succession thereto. Five Justices believed that Buck v. Beach
" New Orleans v. Stempel (1899), 175 U. S. 309; Bristol v. Washington
County (1900), 177 U. S. 133, 141; State Assessors v. Comptoir National
d'Escompte (1903), 191 U. S. 388, 403; Insurance Company v. New Orleans
(1907), 205 U. S. 395, 400.
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should be broadly interpreted as announcing a contrary doctrine
as applied to property taxation. Yet seven judges applied
reasoning which admitted of no distinction between the rules of
due process to be applied to the two types of taxation. The
"privilege" doctrine was responsible for the concurrence of two
Justices in the result, a concurrence necessary to the result, but
the "privilege" doctrine itself was ignored by the rest of the
Court.
The law of due process in relation to the taxation of the suc-
cession to negotiable instruments as propounded by the Supreme
Court of the United States is thus far from being an apotheosis
of the privilege doctrine. The sentiment of the court which
decided it, may be said to have been dominently positivistic in
the sense of opining that the power to tax must be based upon
actual jurisdiction over the res and not upon potential jurisdic-
tion over a cause involving the res. Who may say that the court
is not now ready to discard Buck v. Beach as that case has been
heretofore broadly interpreted to deny the power to impose a
property tax?
(c) State of the Locus of Mortgage or Collateral Security.
On the question as to whether the jurisdiction of the state
over property mortgaged or pledged to secure a debt invests
the state with power to tax the succession to the debt, where no
other jurisdiction over the debt exists, the Supreme Court of
the United States has not spoken. Conceivably the power to
tax in such instance may be based upon two independent
doctrines, both known to the law of due process, the first based
upon the fact that the mortgagee or pledgee has an interest in
property located in the state, the second based upon the fact
that, to enforce his debt against the security, he must have re-
course to the processes of the law of the place where the se-
curity is.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Hawkridge
v. Treasurer and Receiver General,50 held that where a non-
resident died the owner of a mortgage on land situated in the
Commonwealth, the succession was taxable under a statute tax-
ing the succession from nonresidents of "all real estate within
the Commonwealth or any interest therein." According to
w(1916), 223 Mass. 134, 111 N. E. 707.
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Massachusetts law, a mortgage passes the legal title to real
estate, but the court indicated that its opinion would have been
the same had the mortgage been only a lien. Common law
mortgages and lien mortgages alike create an interest in real
estate. The real question was and is, can jurisdiction over the
collateral confer jurisdiction over the debt? This question the
Massachusetts court answered in the affirmative.
The Hawkridge case, if not a lineal descendant, at least bears
kinship to a property tax case decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, viz., Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah
County. 7 That case involved an Oregon statute which assessed
mortgaged real estate for taxation to the mortgagee to the ex-
tent of the mortgage debt, and provided for the assessment of
the residuary value, after the deduction of the amount of the
debt, to the mortgagor. The Savings and Loan Society was a
California corporation which held notes secured by mortgages
on Oregon real estate, the notes and mortgages being kept in
California. The sheriff of Multnomah County advertised the
mortgages for sale for non-payment of taxes, and the Savings
and Loan Society sought to enjoin the sale, invoking the Four-
teenth Amendment. The court held that injunction was proper-
ly denied, saying:58
"And it (the state) may for the purposes of taxation,
either treat the mortgage debt as personal property, to be
taxed like other choses in action, to the creditor at his domi-
cile; or treat the mortgagee's interest in the land as real
estate, to be taxed to him, like other real property, at its
situs."
The court placed much emphasis on the fact that there was no
double taxation, the equity of redemption only being assessed
against the mortgagor. The inference was that, had the whole
value of the property been assessed against the mortgagor, an
additional tax on the property interest therein of the mortgagee
would have been void as twice taxing the same interest in the
same thing. In such event the state might still have had re-
course to the taxation of mortgage debts generally as personal
property--constitutional double taxation-but would have been
"(1898), 169 U. S. 421.
Supra, note 57, 1. c. 427.
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inhibited in the case before the court because of the fact that
the owner was a nonresident and kept the securities outside the
state.
Suppose we assume the narrow interpretation of the Savings
and Loan Society case and confine its application to statutes
clearly differentiating between, and separately assessing, the
interests of mortgagor and mortgagee. Even here the spelling
out of the state authority is surrounded with difficulty. A sale
of the mortgagee's interest in the land is made for non-
payment of taxes. What does the purchaser at the sale get?
Fundamental principles of law would seem to deny him the right
to the mortgage notes. The mortgagee has a personal right of
action on the notes, which is wholly transitory, and which he
can enforce against the maker thereof independently of the
mortgage. Over these notes, when held by nonresidents and
kept outside the state, the state has no jurisdiction and, it would
seem, could pass no title by a tax sale. Suppose that an Oregon
maker were sued on his notes in a California court by a Cali-
fornia citizen, would his defense that the notes were sold for non-
payment of taxes on the mortgage interest securing the notes
be good? It seems that the California court would be bound to
ignore the mortgage, in the same manner as if the mortgagee
had relinquished its lien preserving his right of action on the
notes, and render judgment for the plaintiff. Conversely, it
would seem equally true that the mortgagor would not be pro-
tected by paying the purchaser at the tax sale, because the pur-
chaser would get no mortgage debt by virtue of the sale-merely
a mortgage securing some one else's notes- namely, nothing.
The fundamental difficulty in the theory that a state may tax
either a mortgage interest, or the succession to a mortgage
interest as is the holding of the Hawkridge case, is that the debt
is not inherent in the mortgage interest or collateral security.
True, the mortgagee may find it necessary to resort to the mort-
gage in order to collect his debt. But that is another basis of
jurisdiction which the Massachusetts court did not invoke. Mere
jurisdiction over the collateral res is not of itself tantamount
to jurisdiction over the debt. The latter is transitory and
should not be anchored to the res for the mere purposes of
taxation.
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The Michigan court in In re Rogers' Estate9 went to the full
extent of adopting the privilege doctrine to justify a tax on the
succession to mortgage debts owned by nonresidents. Since the
creditor may need to have recourse to the laws of the state
where the mortgaged property is situated, it said, that state
may impose a tax on the protection which it affords. This is
Blackstone v. Miller in a slightly different guise. The reasoning
advanced by the critics of an assumed jurisdiction by virtue of
the debtor's residence in the state, largely applies here. If the
privilege doctrine is law, then, for an actual jurisdiction over
the debt, the state may substitute a potential jurisdiction to en-
force it and thereby spell out a power to tax. Likewise
analogous objections based upon practicality apply. If the
existence of mortgage security in the state justifies a tax on the
succession to the mortgage debt, then the owner of a general
mortgage bond of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad
Company owes fealty to the ten or more sovereigns whose do-
mains the rails of that carrier traverse, to each to the extent
that the value of property within the domain bears to the total
property mortgaged. It is no answer that, in such case, since
the debt might be satisfied without recourse to the intra-state
property, the power to tax does not subsist. This was made the
basis of denying the applicability of the Blackstone case by two
well meaning courts, 0 without observation, however, of the
fundamental fact that the Blackstone doctrine is wholly based
upon the potentiality of recourse to the state law. Where one
court affirms jurisdiction because recourse may be had and
another denies it because it may not be taken, that is necessarily
contrariety of doctrine.
Fortified by the reasoning of both the Massachusetts court
and the Michigan court, a tax on the succession to debts owing
to nonresidents secured by a mortgage of property in the state
has been upheld in Iowa el and Maryland.62 The weight of au-
- (1907), 149 Mich. 305, 112 N. W. 931.
"See State v. Chadwick (1916), 133 Minn. 117, 157 N. W. 1076, 158
N. W. 637; Fuller v. South Carolina State Tax Commission (1923), 128
S. C. 14, 121 S. E. 478.
'Chaffin v. Johnson (1925), 200 Iowa 89, 204 N. W. 424.
* Helser v. State (1916), 128 Md. 228, 95 A. 539.
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thority by a milligram is to the contrary.6 3 It seems a sound
doctrine that secured debts should not be taxable except in those
states where the debt would be taxable if unsecured, for recourse
to the security is until default a mere contingency.
What position will be taken by the Supreme Court of the
United States when the question comes to it on the constitutional
issue, is merely conjectural. Perhaps there are those who hope
that it will find the Multnomah County case to rest upon the
peculiar provisions of the Oregon tax law there involved, and
feel itself free to render a decision strictly limiting Blackstone v.
Miller.
IV. JURISDICTION OF FOREIGN STATES-CORPORATE SHARES
The conceivable grounds of jurisdiction to tax the succession
to corporate stock appear to be five: (a) residence of the
decedent at the time of his death, (b) domestic incorporation,
(c) existence of corporate property or conduct of the corporate
business, (d) physical presence of the certificates representing
the stock, and (e) presence of the corporate transfer books in
the state.
(a) Jurisdiction of Domiciliary State Reviewed.
That the state of the decedent owner's last domicile may tax
the succession to corporate stock was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Frick v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania64 and Blodgett v. Silberman." Those decisions achieved
a consistency of the law of due process relating to succession
taxes with the law of due process relating to property taxes, for
it had been definitely settled by Hawley v. Malden that the
state of the owner's domicile may impose ad valorem taxes on
corporate stock. Since the power of the state to tax the prop-
erty lays no claim to special privilege and finds its justification
only in jurisdiction over the res, it would follow that such juris-
aWalker v. People (1918), 64 Colo. 143, 171 P. 747; State v. Chadwick
(1916), 133 Minn. 117, 157 N. W. 1076, 159 N. W. 637; Matter of Fearing
(1911), 200 N. Y. 340, 93 N. E. 356; Fuller v. South Carolina State Tax
Commission (1923), 128 S. C. 14, 121 S. E. 478; McLaughlin v. Cluff
(1925), 66 Utah 245, 240 P. 161.
"(1925), 268 U. S. 473.
(1928), 48 S. Ct. 410, 72 L. Ed. (Adv.) 470.(1914), 232 U. S. 1.
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diction, sustained as to property taxes, should, a fortiori, be
sustained as to succession taxes.
(b) State of Incorporation.
But not only does the Frick case affirm the jurisdiction of the
state of the owner's domicile over corporate stock, but it also
affirms the jurisdiction of the state where the corporation was
chartered. This is the necessary effect of the holding in the
case that the power of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
where Mr. Frick had been domiciled at the time of his death, to
tax, was limited to the value of the stocks owned by him in ex-
cess of the tax imposed by the states where the corporations
were located. The allowance of a deduction for taxes imposed
by the latter states from the value of the corporate stock for the
purposes of determining the amount of the tax in the state of the
decedent owner's domicile, necessarily involved the decision that
the taxes deducted were constitutional.
There is nothing new here. The state courts have practically
unanimously sustained the power to tax the succession to stocks
where jurisdiction was based solely upon domicile of the cor-
poration within the state . 7
Moreover, in Corry v. Baltimore,"8 the Supreme Court of the
United States had sustained the constitutionality of a property
tax imposed by the state of the corporation's domicile on cor-
porate stock owned by nonresidents. The theory of the juris-
diction is generally stated as follows: Since the state of in-
corporation grants the stockholders the franchise to be a cor-
poration, it may impose, as a condition to their holding of such
franchise, the duty of paying taxes on their respective shares.
To say that the state imposes an express condition of taxing
power on the grant of the franchise is to resort to fiction. If
the jurisdiction must be spoken of in terms of metaphysics, I
prefer the following statements: the interests, which a share
of stock represents, are expressed by the charter of the cor-
poration and inhere in its franchise to exist as such, and that
franchise is property within the state. By virtue of the exist-
ence of that franchise, the stockholders' indivisible interests in
the corporate property are created, defined, and transmuted into
e The cases are collected in 42 A. L. R. at p. 365.
"(1905), 196 U. S. 466. And see Tappan v. Bank (1873), 19 Wall. 490,
for the origin of the doctrine.
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a corporate title. However, it is scarcely necessary to interpret
the rule in terms of metaphysics. If the doctrine of business
situs is accepted as a basis of taxation-and there seems little
doubt that it inheres in the law of taxation-its justification ex-
tends to and embraces the case of corporations chartered in the
taxing state. It is a legal fact, if not always a business fact,
that the stockholder's business is administered in the place
where the corporation is chartered. There the stockholder's
interests has in law its business situs.
The really new departure of the Frick case in respect to tax-
ation of corporate stock is the attemnpt to assign priority of
claim to the state of incorporation. Observe the following pas-
sage of Mr. Justice Van Devanter's opinion :09
"The decedent owned many stocks in corporations of
states, other than Pennsylvania, which subjected their
transfer on death to a tax and prescribed means of enforce-
ment which practically gave those states the status of
lienors in possession. As those states had created the cor-
porations issuing the stocks, they had power to impose the
tax and to enforce it by such means, irrespective of the de-
cedent's domicile and the actual situs of the stock certifi-
cates. Pennsylvania's jurisdiction over the stocks neces-
sarily was subordinate to that power. Therefore, to bring
them into the administration in that state it was essential
that the tax be paid. The executors paid it out of moneys
forming a part of the estate in Pennsylvania, and the stocks
were thereby brought into the administration there. We
think it plain that such value as the stocks had in excess of
the tax is all that could be regarded as within the range of
Pennsylvania's taxing power. Re Miller, 184 Cal. 674, 683,
16 A. L. R. 694, 195 Pac. 413. So much of the value as was
required to release the superior claim of the other states
was quite beyond Pennsylvania's control. Thus the in-
clusion of the full value in the computation on which that
state based its tax, without any deduction for the tax paid
to the other states, was nothing short of applying that
state's taxing power to what was not within its range."
This is an empirical and practical view. Its equity oppresses
no conscience. To the succession at the domicile of the
decedent, the stock has such value only as may be ascertained
by deducting from its market value, the amount of the tax
' See p..497, case, supra, note 64.
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charged against it by the state of incorporation. However, to
those who adhere to a notion that the power of the domiciliary
state to tax is a quid pro quo for the protection afforded by the
law controlling the succession, the conception of such power
being subordinate to the power of another state must be quite
unintelligible. For, if the claim of the domiciliary state rest
upon such protection, such claim must attach at the very moment
of the owner's death and pervade the succession in its nascency.
(c) States in which Corporation Has Property or Transacts
Business.
The third inquiry, viz., whether a state has power to tax the
succession to a nonresident's stock in a foreign corporation
which holds property and transacts business in the state,
virtually resolves itself into the question, whether the protec-
tion afforded that property and the tolerance accorded that busi-
ness furnish ground to pierce the veil of corporate entity.
That question was squarely before the Supreme Court of the
United States in Rhode IsMand Hospital Trust Company v.
Doughton,70 which reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina7l sustaining jurisdiction to tax.
The facts of the case were these: The decedent, George
Briggs, was domiciled in Rhode Island at the time of his death.
Among his personal property was a block of stock in the R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company, a New Jersey corporation, which,
however, was licensed to and did do business in North Carolina.
Two-thirds in value of its property was located in North Caro-
lina. The state authorities assessed a tax based on two-thirds
of the value of the stock, claiming the right to do so under a
statute which expressly provided that property within the state
subject to succession taxes should include bonds and shares of
stock of foreign corporations owning property in the state if
fifty per cent or more of its property be located in the state, the
valuation, upon which the tax was to be computed, to be the
proportion of the total value of the bonds or shares which the
corporate propery located in the state bore to the total corpo-
rate property. The executor, in order to obtain transfer of the
stock, was forced to pay the tax under protest, and the jurisdic-
(1926), 270 U. S. 69.
(1924), 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741.
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tion to tax was put into issue by a suit to recover the amount
thereof.
The state's claim to jurisdiction based upon corporate prop-
erty in the state, could scarcely have been presented more
favorably, either from the standpoint of the explicitness of legis-
lative intent expressed by the statute to exercise the taxing
power, or from the standpoint of the fact of jurisdiction over a
substantial amount of corporate property. The constitutional
issues of the case were therefore clearly defined.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States by
Chief Justice Taft has, in the earlier pages of this paper, been
cited as exemplary of the court's present philosophy to regard
the state's power to tax succession as co-extensive with its jur-
isdiction over the property. As applied to corporate stocks, it
denied that jurisdiction over the corporate property is tanta-
mount to jurisdiction over the stockholders' interests therein.
Between the two the corporate entity intervened. Likewise the
court declined to hold that the corporation's licensing to do
business in the state and doing such business constitute the
shares property within the state.7 2
"The owner of the shares of stock in a company is not the
owner of the corporation's property. He has a right to his
share in the earnings of the corporation, as they may be de-
clared in dividends, arising from the use of all its property.
In the dissolution of the corporation he may take his pro-
portionate share in what is left, after all the debts of the
corporation have been paid and the assets are divided in
accordance with the law of its creation. But he does not
own the corporate property. ...
"North Carolina cannot control the devolution of New Jer-
sey shares. That is determined by the laws of Rhode
Island where the decedent owner lived or by those of New
Jersey, because the shares have a situs in the state of in-
corporation. . .
"In an addendum to its opinion in this case, the supreme
court of North Carolina suggests that the jurisdiction of
the state to tax the shares of the New Jersey corporation
may be based on the view that the corporation has been
domesticated in North Carolina. So far as the statutes of
the state show, it has been authorized to do and does busi-
ness in the state, and owns property therein and pays a fee
"Supra, note 70, 1. c. 81, 83.
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for the permission to do so. It has not been reincorporated
in the state. It is still a foreign corporation and the rights
of its stockholders are to be determined accordingly."
In accomplishing this result, the court overrode considerations
which were not without equitable merit. The North Carolina
court, while unable convincingly to identify the stockholder's
interest in the corporation with his interest in the corporate
property, so as to spell out a succession to the property which
might be taxable, relied largely upon the view that the protec-
tion afforded the property inured ultimately to the stockholder,
and justified the tearing of the corporate veil. The opinion em-
phasized the privilege nature of succession taxes, and invoked
the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller.78 In so doing the court
demonstrates the elasticity of that doctrine and the uncertainty
of the tests of its application.
The weight of authority among the state courts prior to the
Rhode Island Hospital case had denied that shares owned by a
nonresident decedent in the stock of a foreign corporation own-
ing property in the taxing state, were property "within the
state" in the statutory sense.7 4  That such shares were not
property "within the state" in the constitutional sense had been
foreshadowed by Tyler v. Dane County, Wisconsin."
(d) State of Locus of Stock Certificates.
Our fourth inquiry into claims of taxing power with respect
to shares of corporate stock concerns the jurisdiction of a state
to tax the shares of a nonresident decedent in a foreign cor-
poration where the certificates evidencing the shares are phys-
ically present in the state. Where the shares are the property
of a resident decedent, or where the certificates are to shares in
a domestic corporation, of course, an independent ground of
jurisdiction to tax exists. The question here is one of taxing
power where the sole ground of jurisdiction is the presence of
the certificates in the state.
"Supra, note 71, 1. c. 277.
"State v. Dunlap (1916), 28 Idaho 784, 156 P. 1141; People v. Dennett
(1916), 276 Ill. 43, 114 N. E. 493; Oakman v. Small (1918), 282 fl1. 360,
118 N. E. 775; Welch v. Treasurer General (1916), 223 Mass. 87, 111 N. E.
774; State v. Walker (1924), 70 Mont. 484, 226 P. 894; Re Harkness (1921),
83 Ok. 107, 204 P. 911; Shepard v. State (1924), 184 Wis. 88, 197 N. W.
344; cf. Matter of McMullen (1922), 199 App. Div. 393, 192 N. Y. S. 49,
affirmed (1923), 236 N. Y. 518, 142 N. E. 266; see Beale, "Progress of the
Law: Taxation" (1925), 38 HARv. L. REV. 281, 291; note in 42 A. L. R. 413.
' (1923), 289 F. 843.
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So far as I am aware, the Supreme Court of the United States
has not had the question before it for decision. Although in the
Rhode Island Hospital case, it mentioned the presence of the
certificates as a possible basis of claim, the point was not there
involved, since the certificates were located at the decedent's
domicile, and no view was required or stated. The Louisiana
court in sustaining the tax under consideration"o cited as au-
thority for its decision Direction der Disconto-Gesellsehaft v.
United States Steel Corporation.77 In the latter case, a German
corporation, alleging itself to be the owner of shares in the
United States Steel Corporation, claimed the right to have new
certificates issued to it, and to have outstanding certificates in
the hands of the British Public Trustee cancelled. At the out-
break of the war, plaintiff had been the owner of the shares,
causing the certificates to be endorsed in blank and deposited
with a London branch. The Public Trustee had seized the cer-
tificates under the British Enemy Act, and had procured a
transfer on the books of the Steel Corporation. Relief was de-
nied on the ground that title to the shares had passed in ac-
cordance with the laws of New Jersey (where the corporation
was chartered), permitting transfer of title by endorsement and
delivery of the certificate, and the laws of England respecting
the validity of the delivery. Manifestly the decision involved
no holding that the shares of stock were located in England.
The most that can be contended for the authority of the case is
that the unequivocal recognition of the passing of title by en-
dorsement and delivery furnishes ground for the position that
the shares inhere in the certificates and have physical location
where the certificates may be. Said the Louisiana court in the
Newell case :78
"The transferable value of the stock lies therefore
wholly in the certificates; and thus the certificates are by
law made the corporeal or physical representatives of the
stock itself, so that, where the said certificates are, there
also the stock itself is physically located."
The justification for a tax on the succession to stock in the state
of the locus of the certificate is the same as that interposed to
"Newell v. Tremont Lumber Company (1926), 161 La. 649, 109 So. 344.(1925), 267 U. S. 22.
,Supra, note 76, 1. c. 652.
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support such a tax on the succession to negotiable instruments.
And the question is, has a stock certificate such a character as
to bring it within the ratio decidendi of Wheeler v. Sohmer?
The Massachusetts court in Kennedy v. Hodges,79 held that
shares of stock do not inhere in the certificates evidencing them
so as to be property subject to administration in the state where
the certificates may be found at the time of the owner's death.
The considerations leading to such a conclusion are considera-
tions equally applicable to the question of amenability to suc-
cession taxation, and a quotation from the decision may be
ad9pted in lieu of extended discussion of the nature of stock
certificates :80
"A certificate for shares of stock in a corporation, al-
though evidence of title, does not constitute the title. It is
not the stock. 'Shares in a corporation are not chattels
personal susceptible of possession, actual or constructive.
* * A share in a corporation is a right to participate
in the profits, or in a final distribution of the corporate
property pro rata.' Field v. Pierce, 102 Mass. 253, 261.
Failure on the part of a corporation to issue the certificate
does not impair the rights of a stockholder who is notwith-
standing entitled to be treated as such. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159,
198, and cases cited. A certificate of stock is not necessary
to the existence of the property. 'It certifies to a fact
which exists independently of itself.' Pacific National
Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227, 234. The paper upon which
the certificate is printed is not the thing of value, but the
ownership in the fractional part of the assets of the cor-
poration. This analysis of the nature of a certificate of
stock makes it difficult to conceive of the certificate itself as
capable of having an independent situs. No doubt modern
commercial usage treats certificates of stock as possessing
some of the attributes of property. They are generally
bought and sold and pass by delivery when properly in-
dorsed like ordinary chattels, but such transfers are sub-ject to equities in favor of the owner named in the certifi-
cate, and title ordinarily can be transferred only on the
books of the company upon surrender of the certificate.
Baker v. Davie, 211 Mass. 429, 437. They may be hypothe-
cated and pledged, and be the subject of replevin or an
action of conversion. Statutes may provide for their at-
" (1918), 215 Mass. 112, 114, 102 N. E. 432.
"See p. 114, case, supra, note 79.
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tachment. For some purposes and under some circum-
stances certificates of stock may be more than evidence and
many possess some of the incidents of property and be 'a
constituent of title.' Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 161;
Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N. Y. 193;
Meritt v. American Steel Barge Co., 24 C. C. A. 530, 537;
Opinion of the Justices, 196 Mass. 603; Puget Sound
National Bank v. Mather, 60 Minn. 362. Nevertheless, we
are aware of no decision which has gone to the extent of
holding certificates of stock to be the equivalent of the
shares they represent, or to be the shares themselves, or to
be capable of an independent situs except possibly by ex-
press statute. See Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392. They bear
many analogies to deeds of real estate or bills of sale of
personal property. We are able to perceive no reason for
holding them in a case like this to be the property itself or
anything more than evidence of it. It is anomalous to
think of such property having a possibility of a situs in
three different places, namely, at the domicile of the owner,
at the domicile of the corporation and in the jurisdiction
where the certificate itself may chance to be."
Except in Louisiana, the state courts have generally denied
that shares of stock are property within the state for the pur-
poses of succession taxation merely by reason of the presence
of the certificates. 8' Such a rule appears sound both as a mat-
ter of statutory construction and as a matter of constitutional
limitation. Aside from the technical consideration that com-
plete legal title to the shares passes only by transfer on the
books of the company, the negotiability, which the owner has
potential power to confer upon the certificates by endorsement
in blank, is a qualified negotiability, not as broad as the negotia-
bility attaching to bills and notes, and not, it seems, of the dig-
nity requisite to identify the certificate with the shares. In
the contrast between representatives of title, such as promis-
sory notes, and mere evidences of title, such as deeds to real
estate, stock certificates would seem more readily assimilable
to the latter. That the doctrine of Wheeler v. Sohmer, a
doctrine itself originated by a divided court, will be extended to
I People v. Griffith (1910), 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313; Matter of James
(1894), 144 N. Y. 6, 38 N. E. 961; In re McMullen's Estate (1922), 199
App. Div. 393, 192 N. Y. S. 49, affirmed (1923), 236 N. Y. 518, 142 N. E.
266; Cassidy v. Ellerhorst (1924), 110 Ohio St. 535, 144 N. E. 252.
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include stock certificates, as well as bills and notes, seems un-
likely.
(e) State of the Locus of the Transfer Books.
If shares are transferable only on the books of the company,
does the presence of the books within the taxing state, without
further ground of jurisdiction, vest the power to tax the suc-
cession thereto? This is the fifth inquiry into the sources of
the taxing jurisdiction over corporate stocks. Admitting the
fundamental character of succession taxes as taxes on the trans-
fer of property, yet, according to the test of power to tax an-
nounced in the Rhode Island Hospital case, such transfer tax
should not be exigible unless the property were within the juris-
diction of the state. In view of this fundamental consideration,
the question may be restated as follows: Does the presence of
the transfer books in the state carry with it the presence of the
stock?
The purpose of having the books in the state seldom has any
relation to the rights of the stockholders, but usually arises out
of a business convenience, viz., to have the books accessible to the
exchange where trading in the shares takes place. The transfer
office represents merely an incidental function in the corporate
life, and it should, no more than the office where directors' meet-
ings are held or the auditing department is housed, have dignity
to bring the stockholders' property within the state. The
principle of the Rhode Island Hospital case, viz., the state where
the corporation transacts business does not thereby acquire
jurisdiction over its stock so as to tax the succession thereto,
should, in my opinion, govern. While not discussing the con-
stitutional features, the New York court in Dunham v. City
Trust Company 82 has reached the result that successions to
shares of stock are not taxable by reason of the presence of the
transfer office in the state.
The law relating to corporate stock, while incompletely de-
veloped, gives little scope to the theory that power to tax has
sources ultra jurem rei, and seems wholly explicable without re-
sort to the privilege nature of succession taxation.
(1906), 115 App. Div. 584, 101 N. Y. S. 87, affirmed (1908), 193 N. Y.
642, 86 N. E. 1181.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the treatment of the power of a state to tax the succession
to intangible personal property of nonresidents, I have touched
only upon debts and corporate shares. I have not attempted to
discuss problems relating to partnerships, unincorporated asso-
ciations, business trusts, real estate holding trusts, railway
equipment trusts, executory contracts for the sale of land, and
a multitude of other species of choses in action. To have done
so would have resulted in a catalogue of powers.
In my selection of debts and corporate shares, I have been
guided by the fact that these types of choses in action are the
most frequently discovered constituents of decedents' estates
and by the additional and naturally consequent fact that they
have the most frequently been the subjects of adjudication.
Around them the fires of controversy have played, and hence
my conclusions may not in all, nor even in most, instances pass
unconsumed.
In examining the power of the domiciliary state and of for-
eign states to tax, but one case decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States has presented itself within the scope of
this paper which, as I conceive the law, justifies the assumption,
that, because succession taxes are not property taxes but taxes
on the privilege of succession, a state has power to measure the
succession tax by property which it has no power to tax directly.
That ase is Bckstone v. Miller. While the result therein
reached, that the state of the debtor's residence may tax the
succession to the debt upon the demise of the creditor, may be
so firmly embedded in the law that there is little hope of its be-
ing overruled, yet there is reason to believe that the result would
have been very different had the case arisen twenty years later.
One other case, Wheeler v. Sohmer, has attained a result, as to
jurisdiction for the purposes of succession taxation, which is at
variance with the theretofore existing rule as to jurisdiction
over property for the purposes of direct taxation. It will be
recalled that there a tax on the succession to negotiable instru-
ments by the state of the locus of the paper was sustained.
But in that very case the expressions of opinion by a majority
of the court constitute, as we have seen, an apotheosis of the
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doctrine that jurisdiction for succession tax purposes is identi-
cal with jurisdiction for direct taxation.
The more recent cases, Frick v. Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, Blodgett v. Silberman, and Rhode Island Hospital Trust
Company v. Doughton, are clear in the enunciation of the prin-
ciple that to measure a succession tax by property Values, there
must be jurisdiction over the property, and in those cases sue-
cession tax decisions and property tax decisions are inter-
changeably cited. I submit that it remains only to state
definitely, that the privilege character of succession taxation
has no further influence in extending the jurisdiction of the state
to measure a succession tax by the value of property which it
has no power to tax directly.
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